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CASES NOTED
Obviously, the Supreme Court of Florida has attempted to clear the
confusion surrounding the determination of bona fide forestry operations
for the purposes of preferential tax treatment. The court's new reliance
on the "operation" requirement seems logically sound and easy enough to
apply. But the strong language indicating that the chancellor's finding
should seldom be disturbed on appeal seems somewhat paradoxical in light
of the companion decisions. In both Conrad v. Sapp46 and St. Joe Paper
Co. v. Mickler,47 the trial court decisions were ultimately reversed. It is
clear, therefore, that trial court determinations of factual questions are not
as secure on appeal as the language of the supreme court in Greenwood
seems to suggest.
PAUL J. LEVINE
INSIDER TRADING AND RULE 10b-5:
A NEW REMEDY*
In the landmark case of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,1 the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the use of "inside informa-
tion" to purchase stock in a corporation and the "tipping" of such in-
formation to third parties was a violation of section 10(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 19342 and rule 10b-5 thereunder.' By
46. 252 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1971).
47. 252 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1971).
* In 1968, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided the landmark case of
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). While the court set forth
far-reaching principles of new law, many questions were left to be determined by the federal
district court on remand since only the question of liability had been presented to the Second
Circuit for review. Since the parties had stipulated that the question of possible remedies
would be litigated after a determination of liability, many matters were left untended
in the 1968 decision. This note is directed to the return visit of Texas Gulf Sulphur to the
Second Circuit. Judge Waterman, who wrote the first opinion, has also authored this
latest installment. The opinion is a rambling one which contains several sub-holdings within
its principal holding and is a decision which must be read in conjunction with its predeces-
sor. This note treats the primary and secondary holdings of this latest case and also places
the case within its historical perspective as adequately as possible within its limited length.
1. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) [hereinafter cited as section 10(b)].
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipula-
tive or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commissioner may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971) [hereinafter cited as rule lob-5I.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
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stipulation of the parties, the question of what sanctions should be
applied against the violators was to be determined separately by the
federal district court. After a hearing on remand, the district court
ordered the insiders who had violated section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 to
pay the profits which had accrued to them and their tippees as of the
date that the information was released to the public into an interest
bearing fund which was to be held for five years for the purpose of
satisfying civil judgments against the offending insiders with regard to
these transactions.4 According to the court's ruling, any money remaining
in the fund after the five year period would be passed on to the Texas
Gulf Sulphur Company. On appeal to the Second Circuit, held, affirmed:
Requiring corporate insider violators of the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934, who had used inside information to reap profits on stock pur-
chases based on non-disclosed information, to refund all such profits is
proper and does not constitute a penalty assessment since restitution
merely deprives the insiders of the gains of their wrongful conduct. SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
92 S. Ct. 561 (1971).
One of the prohibitions under rule 10b-5 is the use of deceptive or
fraudulent practices in connection with the purchase or sale of any
securities on a national exchange or through interstate commerce. In
numerous cases, including the original SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.
case,6 rule 10b-5 has been applied to limit trading of securities by so-
called "insiders." 6 However, the SEC itself has brought few of these suits.
In fact, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. is apparently the only reported
case where the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought such
an action-at least with regard to insider trading. The reason for this is
twofold: first, once the SEC discovers a violation, the transaction or-
dinarily has already taken place, and the issuance of an injunction pur-
suant to section 21(e) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 19341
would be futile; second, the violations cause injuries to specific individ-
uals, rather than to the public in general.
As a result, the bulk of the actions brought under rule 10b-5 have
been prosecuted by private parties who seek rescission, restitution, or
damages.8 Kardon v. National Gypsum CoY was the first case to allow a
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
id.
* 4. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
5. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.].
6. See generally A. BROMBERG, SECURITnEs LAW: FRAu -SEC RULE 1OB-5 (1967).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1970) [hereinafter cited as section 21(e)]. This section provides,
inter alia, that the SEC may enjoin acts being performed which would constitute violations
of any provision of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
8. See, e.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967). In Myzel, an insider pur-
chased stock with knowledge that there had been an increase in corporate earnings, but
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private party recission or money damages under these provisions despite
the fact that neither section 10(b) nor rule 10b-5 expressly provided for
relief to private parties. The court, in Kardon, reasoned that since the
objective of the Securities and Exchange Act is to regulate securities and
section 10(b) attempts to eliminate manipulation and deceptive practices
with regard to purchases and sales of securities, civil remedies against
the violators would be a logical means of effecting these objectives. Sub-
sequent to Kardon, a number of cases have allowed similar remedies for
such violations.10
In certain instances, however, the SEC has sought injunctive relief
in the courts pursuant to the provisions of section 21 (e) in connection
with violations of other provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act.
In one such case,1 the SEC sustained an action in which an injunction
was issued to prevent a company from continuing to violate the report-
ing requirements of the Act. 2
Despite the admitted access of the SEC to seek the exercise of the
injunctive powers of the courts under section 21(e), the appellants in
the instant case argued that the remedy granted was improper because
it was not expressly provided for in section 21 (e).13 In refuting appel-
lants' arguments, the court looked to three other areas where remedies
not expressly provided for under the securities acts have been fash-
ioned :14 first, a number of cases have allowed the appointment of a re-
ceiver when provisions of the securities acts have been violated, even
though there was no express provision for such appointment in the acts; 15
second, in actions brought by the government under other federal stat-
utes, the courts have allowed restitution, even though the particular stat-
utes did not specifically grant such a remedy; 16 and third, one leading
before this information had been publicly announced. The court held that the injured seller
could recover "out of pocket" damages if recission was not adequate. See also Braumel v.
Rosen, 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969), where damages were allowed in a similar situation
even though recission had been waived by delay.
9. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) [hereinafter cited as Kardon].
10. See note 8 supra and the authorities cited therein.
11. SEC v. Atlas Tack Corp., 93 F. Supp. 111 (D. Mass. 1950).
12. See also SEC v. Computronic Industries Corp., 294 F. Supp. 1136 (N.D. Tex. 1968),
where a C.P.A. was enjoined from practicing before the SEC under a provision of the
Securities Act of 1933 because he prepared inadequate and inaccurate work papers for use
in the compilation of a registration statement.
13. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
92 S. Ct. 561 (1971).
14. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307-08 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
92 S. Ct. 561 (1971).
15. See, e.g., SEC v. Bowler, 427 F.2d 190 (4th Cir. 1970), in which there had been
violations of the registration provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, and the corporation
whose securities were sold had been mismanaged. In addition to the issuance of an in-
junction against the futher sale of unregistered securities and in view of the foregoing cir-
cumstances, the appointment of a receiver to manage the business affairs of the corporation
was held necessary to protect the public.
16. In United States v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616 (1951), restitution of overceiling rent was
allowed, even though section 206(b) of the Housing and Rent Act of 1947 did not provide
1971]
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case, Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.," specifically
limited the remedies available to the ones expressly provided for by a
particular applicable statute.' Unlike the limited availability of remedies
found in Fleischmann, the remedies under section 21(e) were found not
to be as restrictive since that statute broadly provides that the SEC
shall have the power to seek the injunction of practices or acts which
would constitute violations of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
Submitted to close scrutiny, the court's reasoning has several weak-
nesses. In two cases,' 9 the statutes held to provide restitution without ex-
press provisions in the enactment contained language which is somewhat
broader than the wording contained in section 21(e). For example, in
United States v. Moore,'° section 206(b) of the Housing and Rent Act
of 1947 provided that the district court had the power to issue "other
orders" which it deemed appropriate under the circumstances. Section
21(e), however, does not expressly give the courts such discretion. Also,
setting up a fund for payment of possible judgments against persons
violating the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 is sharply distinguish-
able from merely ordering the wrongdoers to make restitution to the in-
jured parties.
On the other hand, there is a great deal of authority to support this
decision. Section 10(b) has been recognized as remedial legislation, and
the United States Supreme Court has encouraged that it be broadly con-
strued.2' This rule of liberal construction has been applied by courts on
numerous occasions in interpreting section 10(b), and the remedies it
allows. 2 As noted previously, private parties have been allowed to bring
civil actions under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 despite the fact that
neither section 10(b) nor rule 10b-5 contain any express provisions for
private civil actions. However, private suits have been permitted on the
for any remedies other than injunctive relief. Act of June 30, 1947, ch. 163, § 206(b), 61
Stat. 193 (1947).
17. 386 U.S. 714 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Fleischmann]. The statute in question
there was section 35 of the Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1964). In Fleisch-
mann, the Court held that attorneys fees would not be allowed as part of costs because
they were not specifically provided for in the Act. "When a cause of action has been created
by a statute which expressly provides the remedies for vindication of the cause, other
remedies should not be readily applied." Fleischmann, 386 U.S. 714, 720 (1967) (emphasis
added).
18. In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), the Court distinguished
Fleischmann by holding that the remedies available under section 14 of Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970) [hereinafter cited as section 14(a)] were
not so detailed as to "circumscribe the courts' power to grant appropriate remedies." Id.
at 391.
19. U.S. v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616 (1951) and Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc.,
361 U.S. 288 (1960).
20. 340 U.S. 616 (1951). See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
21. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
22. See, e.g., Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969), where a tippee
failed to disclose material inside information to the seller of securities. He was held to have
violated section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, even though he had never met the seller face-to-face
but had only dealt with him through a broker.
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theory that they effect the purpose of eliminating deceptive practices and
manipulation in the purchase and sale of securities. The remedy granted
in the instant case can certainly be justified on the same basis.
In addition, the general equity powers conferred upon the federal
district courts by section 27 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 193423
with regard to actions brought under the Act provides substantial author-
ity to allow the remedy. The history of equity indicates that one of its
primary purposes is to secure "general justice not specially provided for
in the ordinary way. . .,,24 In recent times, the courts have indicated
their willingness to permit great flexibility in granting equitable decrees
where the interests of justice will be served.23 It appears, therefore, that
the equitable powers granted the district courts under section 27 would
enable them to grant any reasonable remedy which would further the
goals of the Act.
The appellants, in the instant case, had argued that the restitution
required was punitive in nature since the parties actually injured were
not directly compensated by payment of profits into an escrow fund.26
The courts have generally held, as appellants contended, that the civil
remedies provided for in the securities acts were intended to protect the
public and compensate it for any injuries resulting from violations of
these acts.27 For this reason, continued the appellants, remedies or orders
which operate as penalties are opposed to the letter and spirit of the civil
liability provisions of federal securities laws.
Using the foregoing criteria, the relief granted in the instant case
may be clearly categorized as non-punitive. Although persons injured are
not directly benefited by the restitution, they certainly receive an indirect
material benefit by being assured, at least to the extent of the escrow
fund, that their judgments against the wrongdoers will be satisfied. The
accrual of the residual amounts of the fund to the corporation after five
years is also compensatory, as opposed to punitive, since the corporate
name and reputation may be damaged when its officers and directors
abuse their official positions.28 Moreover, "[i] t would severely defeat the
purpose of the Act [i.e., to prevent manipulation and the use of deceptive
practices in securities transactions] if a violator of Rule 10b-5 were
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970) [hereinafter cited as section 27].
24. Adams, The Origin of English Equity, 16 CoLum L. Rav. 87, 97 (1916).
25. See, e.g., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915), where an action
was brought to enjoin certain businesses from emitting fumes from their factories. Instead
of merely issuing an injunction, the Court ordered the defendants to comply with certain
conditions which were designed to eliminate the nuisance.
26. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
92 S. Ct. 561 (1971).
27. See, e.g., Beck v. SEC, 430 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1970). Here, the court found that
"[tihe purpose of the Securities Acts is to protect the investing public [citations omitted]
and the orders issued by the Commission are intended to be remedial and not punitive."
Id. at 674.
28. See Diamon v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
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allowed to retain the profits from his violation."2 9 Also worthy of note is
the fact that the decision only requires insiders to make restitution to the
extent of the sum represented by the difference between the price of the
stock when purchased as a result of the "inside information" and the
value of the stock at the time of public disclosure of that information.
This reflects the purely compensatory nature of the remedy since it
merely places the insider in the same position as the general public.
Perhaps, the most novel aspect of the decision is the requirement
that one of the appellants make restitution for the profits of tippees from
which he himself theoretically derived no benefit. In light of the fact that
such tipping was expressly held to violate section 10(b) and rule 10b-5,8°
this requirement seems appropriate. Additionally, the argument that a
person receives no benefit from profits derived by his tippees from use
of inside information cannot withstand careful scrutiny. If there were no
provision for restitution for such gains, the insider could make reciprocal
tipping arrangements or simply have a friend or relative purchase the
stock with the understanding that any profits would accrue to the insider.
At this point, it is difficult to predict the ultimate effect of this deci-
sion. From a purely legal standpoint, the case has several weaknesses
which were discussed previously. However, few, if any, leading cases
have been decided solely on the basis of a simple precedent or statutory
provision. Considering the dearth of cases dealing with actions by the
SEC against private parties under section 10(b) and rule 10-5, the deci-
sion is extremely well reasoned.
On the social and economic side, the decision certainly promotes
the purpose of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 in general and of
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 in particular since it substitutes a policy of
full and fair disclosure for the doctrine of caveat emptor in the purchase
and sale of securities."' The new remedy granted by the case discourages
corporate insiders from using "inside information" by effectively prevent-
ing them from reaping any benefit from such use. By the same token, the
parties injured by the use of such information are afforded a practical
means of satisfying their judgments. Hopefully, other federal courts as
well as the state courts which must rule on similar Blue Sky provisions
8 2
will follow the decision in the instant case, despite the fact that the court's
reasoning is somewhat strained at times, since the rationale of the opinion
is supported by substantial legal authority and has the effect of further-
ing the statutory purpose of investor protection.
MALCOLM H. NEUWAHL
29. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
92 S. Ct. 561 (1971).
30. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 852 (2d Cir. 1968).
31. See Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970).
32. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 517.301 (1969).
